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Abstract
Background: Warring groups that compete to dominate a civilian population confront contending behavioral options:
target civilians or battle the enemy. We aimed to describe degrees to which combatant groups concentrated lethal behavior
into intentionally targeting civilians as opposed to engaging in battle with opponents in contemporary armed conflict.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We identified all 226 formally organized state and non-state groups (i.e. actors) that
engaged in lethal armed conflict during 2002–2007: 43 state and 183 non-state. We summed civilians killed by an actor’s
intentional targeting with civilians and combatants killed in battles in which the actor was involved for total fatalities
associated with each actor, indicating overall scale of armed conflict. We used a Civilian Targeting Index (CTI), defined as the
proportion of total fatalities caused by intentional targeting of civilians, to measure the concentration of lethal behavior into
civilian targeting. We report actor-specific findings and four significant trends: 1.) 61% of all 226 actors (95% CI 55% to 67%)
refrained from targeting civilians. 2.) Logistic regression showed actors were more likely to have targeted civilians if conflict
duration was three or more years rather than one year. 3.) In the 88 actors that targeted civilians, multiple regressions
showed an inverse correlation between CTI values and the total number of fatalities. Conflict duration of three or more years
was associated with lower CTI values than conflict duration of one year. 4.) When conflict scale and duration were
accounted for, state and non-state actors did not differ. We describe civilian targeting by actors in prolonged conflict. We
discuss comparable patterns found in nature and interdisciplinary research.
Conclusions/Significance: Most warring groups in 2002–2007 did not target civilians. Warring groups that targeted civilians
in small-scale, brief conflict concentrated more lethal behavior into targeting civilians, and less into battles, than groups in
larger-scale, longer conflict.
Citation: Hicks MH-R, Lee UR, Sundberg R, Spagat M (2011) Global Comparison of Warring Groups in 2002–2007: Fatalities from Targeting Civilians vs. Fighting
Battles. PLoS ONE 6(9): e23976. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023976
Editor: Tom Denson, The University of South Wales, Australia
Received January 4, 2011; Accepted July 28, 2011; Published September 6, 2011
Copyright:  2011 Hicks et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: The authors have no support or funding to report.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: MJHHicks@aol.com
Introduction
Warring groups that compete to dominate the territory of a
civilian population face contending behavioral options: target the
population or battle the enemy. Studies of the intentional targeting
of civilians in armed conflict have been limited primarily to
datasets on conflicts that involve states (i.e. governments) [e.g. 1,2],
and to studies of genocide or of mass killing defined as over 50,000
deaths over five years [e.g. 3,4] [5,6]. More recently developed
conflict datasets such as those of the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (UCDP) [7] used in this study, have allowed more
complete analyses of the behavior of armed groups in war by
encompassing combatant groups involved in low-to-high intensity
armed conflicts and by including conflicts between non-state clans,
rebel groups and rebel factions [e.g. 5,6,8].
Opportunities to increase the understanding of factors affecting
civilian targeting can potentially be multiplied by coupling studies
of civilian targeting by human actors with informative parallels
across disciplines and in nature. For example, national security
defenses against terrorism have been informed by examining:
competitive adaptation between predator and prey; relationships
with symbiotic or pathogenic bacteria; and immune system
defenses against pathogens [9–11]. Interdisciplinary studies have
found the size, organization, and timing of insurgency violence to
show patterns similar to those in ecology and financial markets
[12,13]. In the case of civilian targeting, we consider the dynamics
of warring groups and the civilian population to be potentially
comparable to the dynamics of competing parasitic bacteria and
the parasitized host organism or population as described in a
number of recent studies [14–19]. A civilian population in war can
be considered analogous to a parasitized host in that it possesses a
finite resource – the disputed territory – that warring groups are
competing to dominate and use. Warring groups can be
considered analogous to competing parasitic bacteria in that both
can focus their limited resources either on attacking the competitor
or on attacking the host or civilian population. In this paper, we
will discuss our study and its findings in the context of research
from the fields of biological sciences, social sciences, and conflict
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studies, drawing on parallels between the dynamics of cooperation,
organization, and violent competition found in nature and
dynamics of human armed conflict [9–20].
Typically, studies of armed conflict report findings in terms of
absolute numbers of casualties (e.g. counts of civilian fatalities from
targeting). However, systematic analysis of the proportional effects
of weapons and perpetrators on civilians is being increasingly used
to expand the scope and interpretation of conflict casualty
findings, with direct implications for human rights, public health,
and civilian-protective policies in armed conflict [21–27]. For
example, studies of a single conflict – the Iraq war – have
measured the proportions of women and children among civilian
fatalities to identify relatively indiscriminate effects from perpe-
trators’ use of various weapons [25,26], and to identify varying
effects of civilian targeting by perpetrators using different forms of
armed violence [26]. For studies of combatant groups across
armed conflicts on an international scale, a common problem is
that combatant groups are typically aggregated together at the
country level, or into ‘government’ versus ‘challenger’, despite the
fact that many conflicts involve multiple warring parties [28]. The
disaggregation of findings to particular combatant groups, as in
our study, allows examination of tactics employed at the group-
specific level that could otherwise be obscured by dynamics at the
conflict level [28,29].
Our aim in this study was to describe degrees to which
combatant groups in contemporary human warfare concentrated
lethal behavior into the direct, intentional targeting of civilians as
opposed to battling armed opponents. To do this, we analyzed the
universe of all 226 formally organized combatant groups that used
lethal armed force during the calendar years 2002 to 2007. For
brevity, we hereafter use the term ‘actor’ to describe a formally
organized group that was actively involved in an armed conflict
that resulted in at least 25 fatalities from armed violence in a year
(a threshold that includes low-to-high intensity armed conflicts).
Our paper contributes new information to the field of armed
conflict studies in the following ways: First, we integrated three
datasets so that all state (i.e. government) actors and all non-state
(i.e. rebel or clan) actors in armed conflicts globally could be
analyzed for fatalities they caused by targeting civilians and for
fatalities from battles in which they were involved. Ours is one of
few studies [8,29] that statistically examines relationships between
fatalities from civilian targeting and fatalities from battles. Second,
we measure fatalities from civilian targeting as a proportion of
total direct fatalities from armed conflict. To do this, we use the
Civilian Targeting Index (CTI), a proportional measure that we
introduce in this paper for efficient measurement and communi-
cation of degrees to which actors in armed conflict concentrate
lethal behavior into the direct, intentional targeting of civilians as
opposed to battling armed opponents. Civilian targeting has been
prohibited by formalized social norms on a global scale since the
1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, and by subsequent Associated
Protocols I and II [24,30], making CTI outcomes relevant to
international humanitarian law and to studies of social aggression
and transgression. Third, our data-based attribution of civilian
targeting to named, combatant groups uses a consistent method-
ology to identify the degree to which specific actors exercised
restraint vs. committed civilian targeting. Fourth, we analyze the
universe of actors participating in a recent period of armed conflict
to reveal larger patterns of lethal behavior in armed competition,
specifically in regard to civilian targeting, in real-world environ-
ments of contemporary warfare. This addresses an identified need
for more studies to use empirical data from real societies and
natural settings to complement studies of competition, cooperation
and conflict based on theoretical and laboratory modeling [31,32].
Results
Civilian Targeting by Specific Actors
Using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) [7], we
identified all 226 formally organized armed actors participating in
international or civil armed conflicts in 2002–2007: 43 state actors
and 183 non-state actors. Our findings for specific actors are
shown in Figure 1 and detailed online in Table S1. The x axis of
Figure 1 shows ‘total fatalities associated with an actor’ (on
logarithmic scale), calculated as the number of civilians the actor
killed by direct, intentional targeting plus the number of civilians
and combatants killed in battles in which the actor was involved.
The y axis of Figure 1 shows the degree to which an actor
concentrated lethal behavior into targeting civilians rather than
battling opponents in terms of its Civilian Targeting Index. The
Civilian Targeting Index (CTI) is the proportion of total fatalities
that consists of civilians killed by the actor’s intentional targeting
(the proportion of total fatalities from battles in which the actor
was involved is its reciprocal). In terms of global social norms
formalized in laws of war, which are international humanitarian
laws and customary standards that delineate the proper treatment
of civilians in armed conflict (e.g. the Geneva Conventions)
[24,30], the best possible CTI value is 0 and the worst possible
CTI value is 100.
Actors whose CTI values were 100, meaning that 100% of
associated fatalities were from their direct targeting of civilians, are
found in the upper left quadrant of Figure 1. Our data indicate
that actors with CTIs of 100 were all associated with cumulative
total fatalities numbering fewer than 500 during the 2002–2007
time period. Nine percent (4/43) of state actors and 11% (21/183)
of non-state actors used civilian targeting as their sole form of
lethal behavior in conflict (CTI= 100) (P=0.7). Actors whose high
rates of civilian targeting contributed to some of the bloodiest
conflicts in 2002–2007 are found in the upper right quadrant of
Figure 1. For example, the CTI of 96 generated by the non-state
Front des Nationalistes et Inte´grationnistes (FNI) in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo indicates that 96% of fatalities
associated with the FNI were unarmed civilians killed by
intentional FNI targeting and 4% were combatants or civilians
killed in battles between the FNI and an armed opponent. Another
non-state group, the Janjaweed, had a CTI of 93: 93% of its
associated fatalities were unarmed civilians killed by Janjaweed
targeting and 7% were combatants or civilians killed in battles
between the Janjaweed and an armed opponent. The state actor
Sudan had a CTI of 37 indicating that over one-third of the
14,145 direct fatalities associated with Sudan’s government during
2002–2007 were unarmed civilians killed by the government’s
direct, intentional targeting.
The overall mean CTI for all 226 actors was 18 (95% CI: 13 to
22). Mean CTIs for all state actors (N= 43) and all non-state actors
(N= 183) did not differ significantly (Mean state CTI= 19, 95%
CI 10 to 29. Mean non-state CTI= 17, 95% CI 12 to 22.
P=0.72). Mean CTIs by region did not differ significantly, as
suggested by the heavily overlapping 95% CIs shown in Table 1
(P=0.86). The regions that had the greatest numbers of actors in
armed conflict were Sub-Saharan Africa (N=105: 17 state and 88
non-state) and Asia (N=62: 11 state and 51 non-state).
Crossing the Line: Whether Actors used Restraint or
Targeted Civilians
Overall, 61% of actors (138/226, 95% CI 55% to 67%)
refrained from killing civilians through intentional direct targeting
(CTI= 0) and 39% (88/226, 95% CI 33% to 45%) carried out
some degree of civilian targeting (CTI.0) during 2002–2007. We
Targeting Civilians vs. Fighting Battles
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 September 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 9 | e23976
used bivariate analysis followed by multivariate analysis of the
following variables available in the UCDP datasets of this study to
examine for factors associated with actors that used civilian
targeting as opposed to restraint: type of actor (state or non-state);
scale of armed conflict (in terms of total number of direct
associated fatalities); duration of conflict in years; and region of
actor.
We first explored relationships between civilian targeting and
explanatory variables using bivariate analysis. In absolute
numbers, more non-state actors than state actors carried out
civilian targeting (64 vs. 24, respectively, with CTI.0). However,
a higher proportion of state actors carried out civilian targeting
than non-state actors: 56% (24/43) of state actors targeted civilians
compared to 35% (64/183) of non-state actors (P=0.012). We
considered it possible that the association of state actors with a
higher likelihood of targeting civilians was confounded by state
involvement in conflicts of greater scale, if scale itself was a factor
in whether or not actors targeted civilians, because state actors
Figure 1. Global comparison of fatalities associated with actors in armed conflict during 2002–2007. Total number of direct fatalities
associated with an actor (from battle-deaths and civilian targeting) is plotted against the proportion of total fatalities that was from the actor’s civilian
targeting, termed the Civilian Targeting Index (CTI). Lines show fitted linear regressions for state actors (in red) and non-state actors (in black) that
carried out civilian targeting (actor’s CTI.0).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023976.g001
Table 1. Regional Civilian Targeting Index Results: All Actors in Armed Conflict.
Region Europe
Middle East & North
Africa Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Americas
Actor All State
Non-
state All State
Non-
state All State
Non-
state All State
Non-
state All State
Non-
state
N 9 3 6 30 6 24 62 11 51 105 17 88 20 6 14
Mean CTI 23.35 1.85 34.10 22.39 18.74 23.30 17.29 17.67 17.21 16.99 22.97 15.84 12.89 21.41 9.24
95% CI 210.1
to 56.8
26.1
to 9.8
219.5
to 87.7
8.6 to
36.2
223.3
to 60.8
7.7 to
38.9
9.1 to
25.5
23.2
to 38.5
7.9 to
26.5
10.8 to
23.2
7.6 to
38.4
8.9 to
22.8
21.4 to
27.1
219.7
to 62.5
26.2 to
24.7
SD 43.51 3.21 51.08 36.94 40.04 36.99 32.37 31.06 32.95 32.22 29.96 32.67 30.43 39.13 26.77
Min CTI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max CTI 100 6 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
No. of actors with
CTI.0 (%)
4 (44) 1 (33) 3 (50) 16 (53) 3 (50) 13 (54) 26 (42) 7 (64) 19 (37) 36 (34) 10 (59) 26 (30) 6 (30) 3 (50) 3 (21)
No. of actors with
CTI = 0 (%)
5 (56) 2 (67) 3 (50) 14 (47) 3 (50) 11 (46) 36 (58) 4 (36) 32 (63) 69 (66) 7 (41) 62 (70) 14 (70) 3 (50) 11 (79)
CTI = Civilian Targeting Index. 226 actors: 43 state and 183 non-state.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023976.t001
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were associated with a greater mean number of total associated
fatalities than non-state actors (State mean= 2,809; 95% CI 1,495
to 4,123. Non-state mean= 708; 95% CI 452 to 963. P,0.001).
Table 2 shows the distribution of state and non-state actors across
varying ranges of total associated fatalities: The largest proportion
of state actors (42%, 18/43) was associated with 1,000–4,999 total
direct fatalities and the largest proportion of non-state actors (42%,
76/183) was associated with less than 100 total direct fatalities. We
also considered it possible that the association of state actors with a
higher likelihood of targeting civilians was confounded by state
involvement in conflicts of greater duration, if duration was a
factor in whether or not actors targeted civilians. For example,
proportionally more state actors than non-state actors were
engaged in armed conflict for a total of six years: 11/43 (26%)
of state actors vs. 17/183 (9%) of non-state actors (P=0.004).
Table 3 shows the distribution of actors across different durations
of armed conflict. Among the total of 226 actors, 47% participated
in armed conflict for one year or less, and 13% participated in
armed conflict for the full six years of the study. Regional
distributions of actors with no civilian targeting (CTI= 0) and
civilian targeting (CTI.0) are shown in Table 1. The region that
had the greatest number of actors that targeted civilians was Sub-
Saharan Africa (N=36). However, the proportion of actors that
targeted civilians in Sub-Saharan Africa (36/105, 34%) did not
differ significantly from proportions of actors of other regions that
targeted civilians (P=0.33).
We then carried out multivariate analysis to analyze for
independent contributions to the binary actor outcome of restraint
from targeting civilians (CTI= 0) vs. targeting civilians (CTI.0)
using combinations of the following explanatory variables: total
number of fatalities associated with the actor in 2002–2007
(indicating scale of armed conflict in which the actor was involved);
dummy variables for duration of conflict in years (e.g. the variable
‘2 years’ is coded 1 if the actor was involved in conflict for 2 years,
0 otherwise); dummy variables for region of actor; and the dummy
variable ‘state’ (equals 1 if state, 0 if non-state). Table 4 shows our
logistic regression results. Values in the columns indicate the odds
ratio of each explanatory variable. If the odds ratio is greater than
1, the effect on the dependent variable is positive. If the odds ratio
is between 0 and 1, the effect on the dependent variable is
negative. When duration of conflict dummies were absent (Model
1 and Model 4), the variable for total fatalities was statistically
significant, indicating that additional fatalities were associated with
increased odds of an actor having targeted civilians. However,
with the addition of duration of conflict dummies (Models 2, 3, 5,
and 6), the effect of total fatalities became insignificant, with
significance dropping from the 99.9% confidence level (P,0.001)
to the 90% confidence level (P,0.1), while coefficients for the
duration of conflict had a positive, significant effect on the odds
that an actor targeted civilians at some point during armed
conflict. For example, in Model 2, the odds that an actor targeted
civilians was 3.16 times higher ((3.1621)6100= 216%) for an
actor involved in 3 years of conflict than for an actor involved in
one year of conflict (the comparator duration). The odds that an
actor targeted civilians at some point was 7.92 times higher
((7.9221)6100=692%) for an actor involved in 4 years of conflict
than for an actor involved in one year of conflict. The significant
effect of conflict duration in these models may be because most
actors in the one-year duration group (79%, 84/107) had a CTI of
0. The state vs. non-state dummy and the regional dummies never
approached statistical significance in these models, suggesting that
these actor characteristics had no effect on whether or not actors
targeted civilians when other factors were taken into account.
In summary, the majority of warring groups (61%, 95% CI 55%
to 67%) refrained from intentional, direct civilian targeting during
the period of our study. When possible contributors to civilian
targeting were examined together in multivariate analysis, a
group’s involvement in armed conflict for three years or more was
associated with an increase in its likelihood of having targeted
civilians at some point. These findings do not, however, provide
information on factors that may have affected how much civilian
targeting was carried out by armed groups once they targeted
civilians.
Once the Line is Crossed: Intensity of Civilian Targeting
We examined degrees of civilian targeting by the 88 actors that
targeted civilians during 2002–2007, and factors that may have
affected how much these actors concentrated lethal force onto
targeting civilians as opposed to battling opponents. The mean CTI
for all 88 actors that targeted civilians (CTI.0) was 45 (95% CI 37
to 54). There was no statistically significant difference between the
mean CTIs of state actors that targeted civilians (N=24) and non-
state actors that targeted civilians (N=64) (State mean CTI=35,
95% CI 20 to 49. Non-state mean CTI=49, 95% CI 39 to 60.
P=0.12). Regional analysis of mean CTIs for actors that targeted
civilians showed no statistically significant difference by region, as
suggested by the overlapping 95% CIs shown in Table 5 (P=0.92).
We fit ordinary least squares linear regressions to actors that
targeted civilians to examine whether proportionate levels of
civilian targeting (i.e. concentration on civilian targeting) changed
with total numbers of associated war fatalities. The total fatalities
associated with an actor consisted of civilian fatalities from the
actor’s direct, deliberate targeting plus civilian and combatant
fatalities from battles in which the actor was involved. Because the
classical linear model requires the assumption that data have a
Table 2. Distribution of Actors across Ranges of Total Associated Fatalities in 2002–2007.
Range of Total Fatalities Associated
with Actor All Actors (%) State Actors (%) Non-state Actors (%)
Over 10,000 5 (2.2) 3 (7.0) 2 (1.1)
5,000–9,999 8 (3.5) 4 (9.3) 4 (2.2)
1,000–4,999 40 (17.7) 18 (41.9) 22 (12.0)
500–999 16 (7.1) 2 (4.7) 14 (7.7)
100–499 69 (30.5) 4 (9.3) 65 (35.5)
Less than 100 88 (38.9) 12 (27.9) 76 (41.5)
Total Actors 226 (100) 43 (100) 183 (100)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023976.t002
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normal distribution, we tested, and confirmed, that our data for
the distribution of CTI’s passed normality tests, including:
Shapiro-Wilk, Shapiro-Francia, and skewness and kurtosis tests.
We applied these tests to all actors, state actors, non-state actors,
and to the subsets of these three groups that had CTIs greater than
0, with normality confirmed in all applications. Moreover, we
confirmed our linear regression results using non-parametric tests
that do not assume normality (available upon request).
A linear regression for all 88 actors that targeted civilians
showed a statistically significant correlation for actors associated
with greater total numbers of fatalities (i.e. involved in a greater
scale of armed conflict) to have caused lower proportions of these
fatalities by civilian targeting, with a slope coefficient of 239.1
(95% CI 246.1 to 232.2, t =211.2, P,0.001). We fit separate
linear regressions, shown in Figure 1, to state actors and non-state
actors that carried out civilian targeting to determine whether they
differed in relationships between their degree of civilian targeting
and their total associated fatalities. The 24 state actors that
targeted civilians had a statistically significant slope coefficient of
235.8 (95% CI247.0 to224.5, t =26.6, P,0.001). The 64 non-
state actors that targeted civilians had a statistically significant
slope coefficient of 240.2 (95% CI 249.3 to 231.2, t =28.9,
P,0.001). The difference between the slope coefficients of state
actors and non-state actors was not statistically significant,
indicating that among actors that targeted civilians, state and
non-state actors shared the same quantified dynamic for causing
decreasing proportions of civilian-targeted fatalities as they were
involved in increasing scales of total armed conflict fatalities. To
put it another way, actors that were associated with lower numbers
of battle fatalities tended to focus a greater proportion of their
lethal behavior onto targeting civilians, with no difference between
rebel and government actors.
We then tested whether the finding of decreased concentration
on civilian targeting by actors involved in greater scales of conflict
Table 3. Distribution of Actors across durations of armed conflict in 2002–2007.
Duration of Conflict All Actors (%) State Actors (%) Non-state Actors (%)
1 year 107 (47.3) 13 (30.2) 94 (51.4)
2 years 37 (16.4) 2 (4.7) 35 (19.1)
3 years 27 (11.9) 5 (11.6) 22 (12.0)
4 years 12 (5.3) 5 (11.6) 7 (3.8)
5 years 14 (6.2) 7 (16.3) 8 (4.4)
6 years 29 (12.8) 11 (25.6) 17 (9.3)
Total 226 (100) 43 (100) 183 (100)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023976.t003
Table 4. Logistic regression for independent contributors to actors targeting civilians (CTI.0) as opposed to exercising restraint
(CTI = 0).
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Total Fatalities 1.000405**** 1.00015 1.000176* 1.000376*** 1.000166 1.000188*
2 years 1.70 1.72
3 years 3.16** 3.12**
4 years 7.92*** 8.59***
5 years 6.01*** 7.25***
6 years 5.67*** 5.17***
3–4 years 3.41*** 3.41***
5–6 years 4.65*** 4.63***
MENA 1.41 .72 .81
ASIA .83 .43 .52
SSA .74 .56 .65
AMERICAS .44 .35 .42
State 1.11 1.12 1.48 1.08 1.12
Number of Actors 226 226 226 226 226 226
Pseudo R-square .09 .15 .14 .10 .16 .15
*p,0.10.
**p,0.05.
***p,0.01.
****p,0.001.
Dependent variable is 1 if actor CTI.0, 0 if actor CTI = 0.
Values are odds ratios.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023976.t004
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held when other explanatory variables were added. Simple linear
regressions for the explanatory variable of the log of total fatalities
are shown in Model 1 (for all actors with CTI.0), Model 5 (for
state actors with CTI.0), and Model 8 (for non-state actors with
CTI.0) of Table 6. Table 6 also shows the effect of adding
combinations of the following independent variables in ordinary
least squares multiple regressions: dummy variables for duration of
conflict in years; dummy variables for region of actor; and the
dummy variable ‘state’ (equals 1 if state, 0 if non-state). Inclusion
of the dummy variables did not improve the goodness of fit of the
model, as seen by the adjusted r-square values. In all models for
actors that carried out some degree of civilian targeting, the
intensity of civilian targeting was unaffected by actors’ region or by
actors being state vs. non-state. In models for all actors that carried
out civilian targeting, duration of conflict in years was a significant
factor: actors involved in conflict for three or more years had lower
CTI values than actors involved in conflict for one year (the
comparator). This was because actors participating in one year of
conflict tended to be involved with smaller total numbers of
fatalities and to have higher CTI values than actors participating
in longer periods of conflict. Finally, and importantly, although the
magnitude of the coefficient of logged total fatalities was somewhat
decreased when duration of conflict was accounted for, the effect
of total fatalities on actors’ CTI values remained robust, with a
negative direction and high statistical significance.
Civilian Targeting by Actors in Prolonged Armed Conflict
We analyzed civilian targeting by actors that were involved in
prolonged armed conflict for the maximum duration covered by our
dataset: six years. Figure 2 shows annual CTI values for the 29 actors in
prolonged armed conflict. We included the U.S. because it was
involved in armed conflict for six years in total: as a joint actor with the
U.K. and Australia against Iraq in 2003, and as an individual actor
during the five years of 2002 and 2004–2007 in Afghanistan, Iraq,
Pakistan (involving U.S. drone attacks), and Saudi Arabia (in attacks
on, and by, representatives of the U.S.). As shown in Figure 2, eight
actors refrained from any intentional, direct targeting of civilians
throughout prolonged conflict, maintaining a CTI of 0. Twenty-one
actors targeted civilians in at least one of the six years.
We analyzed for factors that influenced whether or not actors
crossed the line into civilian targeting over the course of prolonged
conflict. Because our data included actors’ CTIs over a series of six
years, we transformed the data into a panel structure for panel
data analysis, which confers regression analysis with the capacity
to examine cross-sectional data (e.g. on actors’ behavior) over
time. Table 7 shows our random effect logit regressions for
independent contributions to the binary dependent variable of an
actor targeting civilians (CTI.0), as opposed to exercising
restraint from targeting civilians (CTI= 0). We analyzed using
combinations of the following explanatory variables: ‘year’ to
identify the time trend; total fatalities associated with the actor
within the year (indicating scale of armed conflict within the year);
dummy variables for region; and the dummy variable ‘state’
(equals 1 if state, 0 if non-state). We confirmed our random effect
logit regression results using random effect probit regressions for
robustness checks and confirmed that the direction and the
significance of coefficients for each variable remained the same
(available upon request).
Models 1 to 3 of Table 7 show results for all 29 actors involved
in prolonged armed conflict. Model 1 is a simple regression model
that contains the time variable (year) as a single explanatory
variable. The odds ratio (.7595) implies that each additional year
was associated with a decrease in the odds of targeting civilians of
24.05% ((12.7595)6100= 24.05%). For Model 2 and Model 3,
we extended Model 1 by including total fatalities within the year,
the 4 region dummies, and the state dummy. The following
variables had no significant effect on whether an actor targeted
civilians vs. exercised restraint: total fatalities within a year, the
actor’s region, or being a state vs. non-state actor. The time
variable, however, remained significant. Holding all other factors
fixed, each additional year was associated with a decrease in the
odds of targeting civilians of about 24%. Models 4 to 6 of Table 7
focus on the 21 actors in prolonged conflict that targeted civilians
in at least one year: for these actors, the time effect continued to be
robust, with similarly decreased odds of targeting civilians with
each additional year. However, regional effects of actors from Sub-
Saharan Africa and the Americas became significantly associated
with increased odds of targeting civilians in this subgroup of actors.
We next analyzed for factors that affected the degree to which
actors in prolonged conflict targeted civilians. Figure 2 gives the
impression that there was no prevailing pattern for increased or
decreased civilian targeting over time. We used the random effects
model of panel regression because Hausman test results (unre-
ported) indicated that this was a consistent, more efficient model
for our data. Table 8 shows panel regressions for relationships
between the continuous, dependent variable of an actor’s CTI and
explanatory variables of: the common log of total fatalities within a
given year; time dummy variables D2003 to D2007 to identify a
specific year effect (e.g. D2003 equals 1 if the observation is from
2003, 0 if otherwise); dummy variables for region; and the dummy
variable ‘state’. The only statistically significant variable was the
Table 5. Regional Civilian Targeting Index Results for Actors that Targeted Civilians.
Europe
Middle East & North
Africa Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Americas
All S N All S N All S N All S N All S N
N 4 1 3 16 3 13 26 7 19 36 10 26 6 3 3
Mean CTI 52.5 5.6 68.2 42.0 37.5 43.0 41.2 27.8 46.2 49.6 39.1 53.6 43.0 42.8 43.1
95% CI 234.7 to
139.7
– 268.6 to
205.0
19.6 to
64.3
297.5 to
172.5
18.1 to
68.0
25.4 to
57.0
25.3 to
60.9
26.9 To
65.5
36.8 to
62.3
17.6 to
60.5
37.4 to
69.8
23.6 to
89.5
280.2 to
165.8
280.3 to
166.5
SD 54.8 – 55.1 42.0 54.3 41.3 39.1 35.8 40.0 37.7 30.0 40.1 44.4 49.5 49.7
Min CTI 4.6 5.6 4.6 1.5 1.5 5.1 0.7 .7 2.7 1.2 1.2 1.4 8.4 14.1 8.4
Max CTI 100 5.6 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
CTI.0 for 88 actors: 24 state (S) and 64 non-state (N).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023976.t005
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SSA dummy, indicating that the CTI values of actors fighting
prolonged conflicts in Sub-Saharan African countries were higher
than those fighting prolonged conflicts in Europe (the comparator
region). We found no statistically significant tendency for actors in
prolonged conflict to increase or decrease their degree of civilian
targeting over time, with total fatalities within a given year, or with
state vs. non-state classification of the actor, even when actors that
never targeted civilians were excluded from the analysis.
In summary, our findings on the 29 actors involved in prolonged
conflict indicate that these actors were more likely to completely
refrain from civilian targeting (i.e. to have CTI= 0) in later years of
conflict than in earlier years. However, their degree of concentra-
tion of lethal behavior into targeting civilians as opposed to battling
opponents (i.e. their actual CTI value) showed no overall pattern of
decrease or increase over time, due to high variability in the
behavior of specific actors over the course of prolonged conflict.
Discussion
Our study shows the degree to which specific, formally
organized actors in armed conflict concentrated their lethal
behavior into intentionally targeting civilians as opposed to
engaging in battles during 2002–2007. We found four significant
behavioral patterns in contemporary warfare. First, the majority
(61%) of all formally organized actors in armed conflict during
2002–2007 refrained from killing civilians in deliberate, direct
targeting. Compared to our finding, a study of actors in interstate
wars during 1900–2003 found that just under half refrained from
killing civilians in targeting [2]. This study’s methodology differed
from ours by excluding actors in intrastate conflicts (e.g. civil wars),
by including indirect (nonviolent) deaths and by requiring at least
1,000 fatalities per year for inclusion (we require at least 25
fatalities per year for inclusion). We expect that if the study
included low-intensity conflicts and intrastate conflicts involving
non-state actors, the percentage of actors refraining from civilian
targeting would be closer to ours, as we show (in Table 3) that state
actors tend to be involved in conflicts of longer duration, which is
itself associated with a greater likelihood of carrying out some
degree of civilian targeting. This takes us to our next point.
Second, controlling for other variables, actors were more likely
to have carried out some degree of civilian targeting, as opposed to
none, if they participated in armed conflict for three or more years
Table 6. Simple and multiple regressions for independent contributors to the degree of civilian targeting (CTI value) of actors that
targeted civilians.
All Actors with CTI.0 State Actors with CTI.0 Non-state actors with CTI.0
Explanatory
variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Log of total
fatalities
239.14****
(3.49)
225.53****
(6.52)
239.48****
(3.71)
226.01****
(6.66)
235.76****
(5.43)
226.99**
(9.66)
237.59****
(6.15)
240.24****
(4.52)
225.93***
(8.51)
240.37****
(4.70)
2 years 213.04
(9.63)
211.64
(10.00)
257.86**
(19.70)
24.52
(11.83)
3 years 228.84**
(11.05)
228.62**
(11.43)
245.65**
(17.85)
224.10
(14.63)
4 years 236.98**
(13.55)
237.18**
(13.98)
250.56**
(19.05)
233.05*
(19.23)
5 years 230.32**
(13.95)
231.63**
(14.56)
233.30
(20.54)
233.32*
(19.19)
6 years 226.70**
(12.92)
226.30*
(13.29)
219.19
(22.71)
228.42*
(16.38)
MENA 28.40
(14.42)
22.21
(14.39)
17.86
(19.70)
14.68
(25.45)
29.73
(18.32)
214.75
(17.74)
ASIA 23.46
(13.87)
3.62
(14.00)
26.21
(18.92)
10.70
(23.49)
21.52
(17.72)
27.65
(17.25)
SSA 27.02
(13.60)
2.93
(13.76)
32.95*
(18.30)
9.96
(23.30)
210.92
(17.34)
212.32
(16.85)
AMERICAS 215.35
(16.74)
29.34
(16.69)
17.14
(21.91)
26.36
(26.29)
25.94
(23.12)
212.41
(22.61)
STATE .57
(6.26)
21.02
(6.39)
1.75
(6.48)
Intercept 153.87****
(10.05)
135.68****
(12.99)
161.57****
(16.32)
136.92****
(18.54)
142.42****
(16.92)
121.01****
(24.84)
139.65****
(31.00)
157.30****
(12.56)
142.09****
(23.39)
168.52****
(19.78)
Number of
Actors
88 88 88 88 24 24 24 64 64 64
Adjusted R-
square
.59 .60 .57 .59 .65 .79 .60 .55 .53 53
*p,0.10.
**p,0.05.
***p,0.01.
****p,0.001.
Includes actors with CTI.0. Actors with CTI = 0 are excluded.
Standard errors in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023976.t006
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Figure 2. Annual Civilian Targeting Index values for the 29 actors in prolonged armed conflict during 2002–2007.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023976.g002
Table 7. Random effect logit regression for independent contributors to actors in prolonged conflict targeting civilians (CTI.0) as
opposed to exercising restraint (CTI = 0) during six years.
All Actors in Prolonged Conflict
Actors in Prolonged Conflict with CTI.0 in at least one
year
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Year .7595* .7528* .7563* .7603* .7625* .7637*
Total Fatalities .9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
MENA .6961 2.8033
ASIA 1.5726 4.0489
SSA 9.1012 27.9962**
AMERICAS 4.4404 11.2273*
State .1699 1.1829
Number of Observations (actors66
years)
174 174 174 126 126 126
Number of Actors 29 29 29 21 21 21
*p,0.05.
**p,0.01.
Dependent variable is 1 if actor CTI.0, 0 if actor CTI = 0.
Values are odds ratios.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023976.t007
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rather than for one year. In regard to this finding, we speculate
that the longer the duration, the more likely that at least some
combatants in an actor’s armed forces will at some point carry out
civilian targeting, which would move the actor from the ‘restraint’
(CTI = 0) to the ‘targeting’ (CTI.0) category. Three possible
reasons for an actor’s movement from ‘restraint’ to ‘targeting’
categories include: 1.) The actor does not control troops
adequately for complete enforcement of a culture of restraint
from targeting civilians – complete enforcement requires an
increasing expenditure of resources to prevent civilian targeting as
the actor has more troops to control for a longer time; 2.) The
actor has a combat culture of disregard for civilians and expends
no resources on preventing civilian targeting; and 3.) The actor
channels resources into a strategy of targeting civilians. Because of
the multiple, in some cases nonspecific, factors that can contribute
to an actor carrying out some degree of civilian targeting as
opposed to none, use in quantitative conflict studies of a binary
outcome of civilian targeting vs. no civilian targeting might not be
highly productive in examining contributors to civilian targeting.
However, because maintaining a CTI of 0 indicates ongoing
resource expenditure, and a more specific, nonrandom element of
choice, concentrating quantitative and qualitative research on
actors that refrain from civilian targeting in war may identify
promising avenues for increasing or supporting civilian-protective
behavior in war.
Our third main finding focuses on the actors that targeted
civilians rather than maintaining restraint from civilian targeting.
Once actors targeted civilians, what were the factors that affected
the degree to which they concentrated lethal behavior into
intentionally targeting civilians? In both simple and multiple
regressions, we found that among actors that targeted civilians,
those that engaged in greater scales of armed conflict concentrated
less of their lethal behavior into civilian targeting and more into
involvement with battle fatalities. Conversely, those that engaged
in lesser scales of armed conflict concentrated more of their lethal
behavior into civilian targeting and less into involvement with
battle fatalities. Also, among actors that targeted civilians, those
that were involved in conflict for total durations of three or more
years concentrated less of their lethal behavior into civilian
targeting than those involved in conflict for one year or less. This
was because the actors that targeted civilians during one year or
less of conflict tended to be involved with smaller total numbers of
fatalities and to have higher CTI values than actors participating
in longer periods of conflict. These findings suggest that warring
groups that targeted civilians during small-scale conflicts of brief
duration tended to concentrate more of their lethal behavior into
targeting civilians than warring groups that targeted civilians
during larger-scale conflicts of moderate or long duration.
Fourth, when factors of scale of conflict and duration of conflict
were accounted for, an actor’s likelihood and degree of targeting
civilians was unaffected by whether it was a state or a non-state
group. The absolute number of non-state (rebel) actors that
targeted civilians (n = 64) was higher than the number of state
actors that targeted civilians (n = 24) only because more non-state
actors than state actors participated in armed conflict (183 vs. 43,
respectively).
We also examined civilian targeting over the course of
consecutive years in the subset of 29 actors that were involved in
prolonged conflict of six years duration in 2002–2007. Controlling
for other variables in panel data analysis to examine cross-sectional
data on actors’ CTIs over time, we found that actors in prolonged
conflict were more likely to refrain from civilian targeting (with a
CTI= 0) in later years of conflict than in early years. Nevertheless,
for actors in protracted conflict, their degree of concentration on
targeting civilians as opposed to battling opponents (i.e. their
actual CTI value) showed no overall pattern of decrease or
increase over time, due to high variability in the behavior of
specific actors over the course of prolonged conflict. The only clear
association was that CTI values for sub-Saharan African actors
tended to be higher than for other regions. In earlier analyses of all
226 actors, we analyzed for the variable of ‘total fatalities summed
for all years of conflict’. This variable was not examined for
association with actors’ CTI values tracked over consecutive years
of prolonged conflict, since it lacks the time-specific element. Our
analyses for ‘all actors’ and for ‘actors in prolonged conflict’
examine different ‘total fatality-time’ dynamics. For actors in
prolonged conflict we used the fatality measure of ‘total fatalities
within the given year’. There was no evidence for this subset of 29
actors in prolonged conflict that there was any association between
high total fatalities within a given year of conflict and their CTI
value for that year, although our failure to find this could be a
consequence of small sample size and numerous explanatory
Table 8. Panel Regression for independent contributors to
the degree of civilian targeting (CTI value) by actors in
prolonged conflict during six years.
Explanatory variables
All Actors in
Prolonged Conflict
Actors in Prolonged
Conflict with CTI.0
in at least one year
Log of total fatalities 1.19
(3.45)
22.12
(4.66)
Y2003 2.43
(4.27)
3.52
(5.89)
Y2004 4.93
(4.28)
7.24
(5.92)
Y2005 21.04
(4.29)
21.98
(5.94)
Y2006 22.52
(4.30)
24.10
(5.95)
Y2007 2.57
(4.36)
21.97
(6.13)
MENA 2.86
(14.43)
5.07
(14.38)
ASIA 4.86
(14.52)
7.24
(14.29)
SSA 30.58*
(14.72)
44.11**
(14.36)
AMERICAS 6.18
(16.77)
9.40
(17.14)
STATE 8.42
(7.09)
4.19
(8.78)
Intercept 24.54
(16.89)
6.56
(19.04)
Number of Actors 29 21
Number of
Observations
(Actors66 years)
174 126
Wald chi-square 17.17 23.47
P-value of Wald
chi-square
.10 .02
*p,0.05.
**p,0.01.
Standard errors in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023976.t008
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variables. Analysis for longer, or different, periods of time than our
study could show different results.
As our findings show, combatants’ adherence to global social
norms against targeting civilians can be quantified to identify the
worst offenders in contemporary warfare, to show variance
between actors, and to identify broad patterns of human behavior
in armed conflict. Civilian Targeting Index (CTI) outcomes that
measure the proportional degree to which actors concentrate
lethal behavior into targeting civilians may be more informative
than binary outcomes that indicate targeting vs. restraint for
indicating probable cases of systematic, strategic civilian targeting.
Actors whose total fatalities from armed conflict were caused in
large part by their intentional targeting of civilians, as indicated by
high CTI values in our paper, can be considered more likely to
have used civilian targeting as a deliberate, systematic strategy in
armed conflict, especially if associated with high absolute numbers
of fatalities [24,25].
Although we refer to a variety of studies across disciplines to
discuss our findings, a particular, though rough, analogy can be
made between a form of microbial warfare and our findings on
human warfare. Many types of bacteria use chemical weapons
when fighting in competition against other bacteria to parasitize a
host, some releasing their bacteriocins (bacteriocidal toxins) by
suicidal self-explosion to kill competitors [14–19]. This is an
example of ‘spiteful behavior’ in nature, which is harmful to both
the actor (e.g. the bacterial suicide attacker) and the recipient (e.g.
the targeted bacterial opponent) [14–17]. A parasitic bacteria’s
harm to the host is ‘selfish behavior’, being beneficial to the actor
(e.g. the parasite) and harmful to the recipient (e.g. the weakened
or killed host) [15]. A civilian population in war is comparable to a
parasitized host in that it possesses a finite resource - the disputed
territory - that opposing actors are competing to dominate and
use. Warring actors can attempt to shift the dynamics of this
competition in their favor by focusing their energies onto
controlling or eliminating the civilian population, or on controlling
or eliminating their opponent, by lethal force. In addition to
competing for territory, armed groups compete, sometimes using
lethal coercion, to gain other resources of the civilian population:
food, information, logistical support and political support. We
believe that our study’s finding that warring actors concentrate less
on killing civilians if they are involved in more lethal battles against
armed opponents is analogous to the decreasing virulence to host
organisms found as competing parasitic bacteria kill each other
more in direct battles using bacteriocins [14–16,18,19].
Cooperative behavior exists at many levels in nature [31] and
has been shown to be increased by enforcement through
punishment, policing and sanctions in humans, meerkats, fish,
social insects, bacteria and plants [31,32,33–36]. One of the best-
known examples of cooperation in humans is warfare, in which
soldiers place themselves at risk of injury or death in an activity
that benefits others [33,36] (analogous to the ‘spiteful’ behavior of
bacteriocin-producing bacteria [14–17]). Once actors are at war,
the exercise of restraint to comply with global social norms (e.g.
laws of war) requires an additional level of cooperation. For
example, in an asymmetric, irregularly-fought war in which Side A
soldiers disguise themselves as civilians, a Side B soldier could
likely decrease his or her individual risk by killing all those
encountered who look like civilians. Not only do Side B soldiers
place themselves at risk by directly battling Side A soldiers, they
accept additional risk when they do not target the civilian
population that could include or support hidden Side A soldiers. In
our study, it is probable that higher levels of cooperation, resources
and maintenance of discipline (i.e. enforcement) were required to
ensure that all soldiers of a combatant group refrained from
targeting civilians to result in actors with CTIs of 0.
On a social level, it may be that actors that refrain from civilian
targeting are responding to historically recent global social norms
that prohibit the targeting of civilians, formalized in treaties and
customary standards that constitute contemporary laws of war
[24,37,38], whereas the regression lines in Figure 1 represent
trends in lethal behavior of actors that operate according to cost-
benefit considerations in which cooperation with, or punishments
against breaching, global norms against civilian targeting have, or
are considered to have, little effect on the actor’s success. It would
be of interest to examine whether the percentage of actors that
refrain from civilian targeting, and the regression slope for actors
that carry out civilian targeting (Figure 1), are different for conflicts
fought before and after the creation of international norms against
civilian targeting such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Replication studies using comparable inclusion criteria and
extending beyond our study’s timeframe will be valuable to test
our findings, as we only show actors’ civilian targeting during
2002–2007, based on the UCDP data available at the time of our
study.
The proportion of fatalities caused by civilian targeting may be
affected by different factors and dynamics than those affecting the
absolute number of civilians killed in targeting. For example,
although studies of state actors have suggested that longer duration
of conflict is associated with actors killing greater absolute numbers
of civilians [1,2], this is compatible with findings from our study,
which differs by focusing on the proportion of total fatalities caused
by civilian targeting in order to quantify an actor’s concentration
of its efforts into civilian targeting as opposed to engaging in
battles. Absolute numbers of civilians killed by targeting can be
calculated from our data by applying the actor’s CTI value (a
proportion) to the total fatalities associated with the actor.
However, we believe that a distinctive value of our study is its
exposure of behavioral patterns of targeting civilians in war
through a focus on proportional analyses.
Other studies in the fields of social sciences, natural sciences,
and conflict studies suggest that the following additional variables
will be important to examine in future research on the dynamics of
groups’ concentration on civilian targeting vs. battling opponents:
regime type [1,5,8]; spatial distribution [14,16,19]; actors’ reasons,
costs and resources for war [1,2,8,29,39–41]; degree of relatedness
between opposing actors and between actors and civilians
[11,14,15,18,39]; and behavior of the civilian population
[9,11,41]. Civilian populations may tolerate or mount resistance
against use of their resources or territory by warring actors and
may do so in complex ways that vary with actors and their
circumstances [41], similar to a parasitized host immune system
interacting with, or reacting against, pathogens [9,11].
Eck and Hultman [5], who also use the UCDP one-sided
violence dataset, find that the regime type of the country in which
actors target civilians is associated with numbers of civilians killed
by targeting, with higher numbers of targeted civilian fatalities in
autocratic and democratic countries and lower numbers in semi-
democracies. This pattern is driven by autocratic state actors
killing greater numbers of civilians by targeting within their
countries and by non-state actors killing greater numbers of
civilians by targeting in democratic countries [5,8]. Findings from
studies that are limited to mass killings and genocide [e.g. 3,4]; that
exclude actors involved in non-state conflicts [e.g. 1,2]; that
combine direct and indirect deaths [e.g. 1,2]; or that combine
civilian fatalities from both targeted and indiscriminate violence
[e.g. 1] may be suggestive but are not directly applicable to this
and other studies that examine direct, targeted fatalities from
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violence of low-to-high intensity involving all conflict actors
[5,6,8].
Actors’ reasons, costs or resources for war can affect civilian
targeting [1,2,8,29,39–41]. Actors’ resources in war can include
numbers and effective capacity of soldiers; numbers and effective
capacity of weapons; financial resources; political power; control of
territory; and civilian support. The dynamics of civilian targeting
can be affected by both absolute and relative resources of actors in
a conflict. For example, Vargas finds empirical support from data
on the Colombian civil war for his model predicting that an actor
that comes into power kills more civilians in territories where its
enemy is powerful, possibly to coerce a shift in civilian support
[40]. Vargas’s study is one of many that address the proposal by
Kalyvas [41] that actors in civil wars target civilians as a group
(which he calls ‘indiscriminate’ violence) more in territories that
are controlled solidly by their opponent and that actors use
personalized targeting of individual civilians (called ‘selective’
violence) more in territories where they have partial but not
complete control, in order to shift civilian support from opponents.
Rather than focusing on where actors target civilians based on
relative control over territory [41], Hultman focuses on when
actors target civilians, and how many they kill, based on their
strength relative to armed opponents on the battlefield [29]. Her
study of civilian targeting by 60 rebel (non-state) actors over 2002–
2004, showed that rebels killed greater numbers of civilians in
targeting after losing more rebel fighters in battles, and after killing
fewer government (state) fighters in battles. In a similar study of
212 non-state groups in conflict with state actors in 1989–2004,
Wood [8] measured relative strength of opposing actors as the
ratio of numbers of rebel troops to government troops and found
that weaker rebel actors, relative to their government opponents,
killed higher numbers of civilians by targeting, with an additional
effect that weaker rebels further increased civilian targeting if the
state actor also targeted civilians. Although civilian targeting by
state actors was not measured as an outcome in these studies
[8,29], their primary finding, which Hultman summarizes as
‘‘rebel violence against civilians is, like terrorism, the weapon of
the weak’’ [29, p. 218], relates closely to our finding that the less
that actors were associated with battlefield fatalities, and the
shorter they fought, the more that they concentrated lethal force
onto targeting civilians; a finding that could be consistent with the
explanation of battlefield weakness of actors. Although our
findings show that state and non-state actors had the same
statistical relationship between concentration on civilian targeting
and total conflict fatalities, further research is needed to determine
whether battlefield weakness can explain high concentrations of
civilian targeting by state actors.
Hultman speculates that weak rebels target civilians as an
alternative strategy to fighting battles because it is a relatively
cheap and easy way to impose extra political and military costs on
its state opponent, and in order to signal the rebel’s power and the
state’s impotence in settings off the battlefield [29,39]. The
signaling function of civilian targeting by weak rebel actors has
been described in anthropological research on civilian targeting by
rebels in Sierra Leone and Liberia [42]. As a Sierra Leonean
commander summarized:
That [targeting civilians] is one of the major tools in
guerrilla warfare. Because when the guerrilla is fighting, he
is less equipped, he has less manpower. He’s going to use
tactics to put fear into the civilian populace and send the
signal to the government that it can’t protect its people…It is
one of the tools the guerrilla uses. Fear and intimidation.
[42, p. 222]
Human actors are particularly able to fine-tune cooperative
behaviors (e.g. warfare) quickly in response to proximate factors
affecting the direct benefit of cooperation during competition at
local and global levels [35]. Local cultural constructions regarding
the nature of political power have been described as predominant
factors in non-state actors’ civilian targeting, even while simulta-
neously these actors vie for political and symbolic power in the
global context of armed conflicts by using the global media [42].
International research shows wide variation in local social norms
for cooperation, punishment and response to punishment across
societies with different cultures, social histories and strength of rule
of law [36]. Although much of the research we describe, including
our own, points to broad patterns of behavior regarding targeting
civilians, local contexts of meaning (e.g. what is ‘power’ or ‘success’
in a conflict) may interact with global social norms to affect the
behavior of specific human actors [36,42]; affecting social norms,
costs and benefits within the context where tactics are used, and
affecting whether actors depart from general trends to become
outliers with unusually low or unusually high levels of concentrat-
ing lethal behavior into the deliberate targeting of civilians during
armed conflict.
Materials and Methods
To create the dataset used for our study, in which all formally
organized state and non-state actors participating in international
and civil armed conflicts are represented, we combined three
datasets compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)
[7] for their overlapping periods of 2002–2007: the UCDP One-
Sided Violence Dataset v. 1.3 1989–2007 for civilian targeting by
state and non-state actors [43,44], the UCDP Battle-Related
Deaths Dataset v. 5 2002–2007 for fatalities from battles involving
at least one state actor [45,46], and the UCDP Non-State Conflict
Dataset v. 2.1 2002–2007 for battle-related deaths from battles
between two non-state actors [47,48]. Our data describe actors
that were associated with at least 25 fatalities, as UCDP requires a
minimum of 25 fatalities in a year for an actor to be included in a
UCDP dataset; a low threshold that allow inclusion of the low-
intensity conflicts in our data. In regard to civilian targeting
specifically, the inclusion of low-intensity conflict is in contrast to
datasets that predated the UCDP one-sided violence dataset and
included only mass killings or genocide [5].
UCDP produces ‘Best’, ‘Low’ and ‘High’ estimates of deaths
based on assessment by human coders of data from a wide range
of open-source, independent sources: the media, NGOs (non-
governmental organizations), governments, international agencies,
truth commissions, and academic reports. Best estimates are based
on UCDP coders’ evaluation of the sources’ credibility and tend to
be conservative [5,49]. We used UCDP Best estimates to provide a
systematically derived baseline estimate of fatalities. This baseline
is expected to undercount deaths to some degree because some
deaths will always go unreported [5,49]. To date, systematic
studies have not been done to determine if civilians killed by
targeting are any more, or less, likely to have their fatalities
included in the UCDP data than fatalities of civilians and
combatants killed in battles, which would be the kind of bias that
could affect our proportional CTI analysis. We chose to use
UCDP Best estimates because they are considered to provide a
confident lower bound for the analysis of trends [5,49], for which
conservative and consistent coding practices are critical, and
because they are used in key, relevant UCDP data analyses in the
literature [5,6].
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What we call ‘civilian targeting’ in our paper is termed ‘one-
sided violence’ by UCDP [43,44], and is defined as the direct and
intentional (also called deliberate) killing of civilians by use of
armed force [5]. UCDP’s one-sided violence includes acts such as
genocide, terrorist attacks on civilians (but not on government or
military targets), mass executions and individual extrajudicial
executions (except for extrajudicial killings in a government prison
or facility). One-sided violence does not include indirect deaths
from conflict, unintentional (also called ‘collateral’) civilian deaths,
or deaths from disregard for civilians when actors attack each
other (e.g. in indiscriminate violence during battles). Our analysis
includes only formally organized armed groups because the
available version of the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset
excluded violence by loosely organized groups such as some clans,
tribes and ethnic groups [44].
We calculated ‘total fatalities associated with an actor’ as all
UCDP’s ‘one-sided violence’ fatalities by the actor [5,43,44,49],
plus all UCDP ‘battle-deaths’ from battles involving a state actor
in which the actor was involved [45,46,49] plus all battle deaths
from battles involving only non-state actors in which the actor was
involved [47,48]. In simpler terms, we calculated ‘total fatalities
associated with an actor’ as the number of civilians the actor killed
by direct, deliberate targeting plus the number of civilians and
combatants killed in battles involving the actor. UCDP ‘battle-
deaths’ are associated with each actor involved in the battle and
combine civilian and military fatalities in battle because many
battle data do not attribute deaths to specific actors or distinguish
civilian from combatant deaths. UCDP battle-related deaths are
all fatalities – military and civilian – directly related to combat
between two military actors [46,49]. Battle-related deaths include
fatalities from traditional battlefield fighting; from guerrilla
activities such as hit-and-run attacks or ambushes; and from
bombardments of military bases, cities or villages: as long as the
intended targets are either military actors or representatives of the
actors.
UCDP battle-related deaths include both indiscriminate and
unintentional (‘collateral’) deaths of civilians. The killing of
civilians in indiscriminate warfare, in which actors do not
distinguish between civilians and opponent combatants, is a form
of lethal behavior which is distinct from the targeting of civilians,
but which is also prohibited under international humanitarian laws
and customary standards [24,30]. Both indiscriminate and
unintentional deaths of civilians are important on moral and
social grounds, and can have substantial quantitative impact in
terms of fatalities. An actor could refrain from intentionally
targeting civilians, yet exact an unacceptably high toll on civilians
in terms of the absolute number or proportion of civilian deaths
among battle deaths. Other studies would be needed to examine
the dynamics of actors inflicting indiscriminate or unintentional
civilian fatalities, which are difficult to distinguish in practice in
compiling conflict data, and which may differ from the dynamics
we find for civilian targeting.
We calculated the ‘Civilian Targeting Index’ as a proportion:
the number of civilians killed in direct targeting by the actor,
divided by the total fatalities associated with the actor. To the
extent that battle-deaths constitute the total associated fatalities of
an actor, total associated fatalities of an actor overlap with total
associated fatalities of other actors involved in those battles. This
does not, however, confound our CTI findings, which are civilians
killed by targeting as a proportion of the total fatalities associated
with an actor.
We show the following data for each of the 226 specific actors
online in Supplementary Table S1: Actor name; Civilian
Targeting Index (CTI); rank by CTI from worst (highest
CTI= 100) to best (lowest CTI= 0), total associated fatalities,
and rank by total associated fatalities. Actors are identified in the
dataset more than once if they acted alone and jointly. For
example, the US is shown as a sole actor and as a joint actor with
the UK and Australia in Iraq in 2003. Due to UCDP coding
procedures established before the period of this study, there are
three actors whose involvement in fatalities is recorded under
partner actors when acting in cooperation: ‘Janjaweed’ results are
for the Janjaweed acting alone, while the Janjaweed acting with
the Sudanese government is coded under ‘Sudan’. ‘US’ results are
for the US acting alone, while the US acting with Iraq or
Afghanistan governments is coded under ‘Iraq’ or ‘Afghanistan’,
respectively. ‘US/UK/Australia’ results are for US/UK/Australia
acting alone, while US/UK/Australia acting with Iraq’s govern-
ment is coded under ‘Iraq’.
Fatalities are not included in the UCDP conflict dataset if they
cannot be associated with any actor (e.g. dead bodies recovered on a
street). This stringent requirement of the UCDP coding process
means that civilian targeting findings from our dataset can be
understood to reflect civilian targeting by combatant groups only,
without inclusion of fatalities resulting from criminal activity from
noncombatants in the conflict environment. Because the perpetrator
of civilian targeting must be identified in order for the fatality to be
included in the UCDP one-sided violence dataset [6], specific counts
of numbers of fatalities from civilian targeting derived from our data
should be considered with caution, as they lack the robustness of the
broad, proportional trends that we present in our findings. Our data
describe actors associated with conflict fatalities during 2002–2007
only: Civilian targeting findings for specific actors could differ
substantially depending on the time period covered.
The UCDP’s data collection methodology of relying on
secondary sources (the media, NGOs, governments, international
agencies, and academic reports) for information on violent
fatalities has the potential to introduce biases arising from how
these sources gather and publish their information. Kalyvas has
described [41] how partisan bias and various forms of urban bias
can affect fatality reporting by all these types of sources.
However, studies that examine conflict coverage bias using
substantial datasets have been few, and older studies of media
coverage of violence cannot reflect technological advances that
have changed data-gathering capacities for recent armed
conflicts. One study found that international news articles
covering civil wars in 1992–1999 very slightly increased as
conflict intensity increased, but at the most extreme intensity of
conflict (over 20,000 casualties per month), such as was only
present in the Rwandan civil war during the study, the number of
news articles covering the conflict started to decrease, possibly
due to the poor quality of information filtering out of Rwanda at
the height of the genocide [50]. A study that compared UCDP
battle-death data for 1989–2002 to fatality data from other
sources suggested that the predominance of English-language
sources in UCDP searches led to good coverage of fatalities in the
Northern Ireland conflict, but undercounted fatalities in Spanish-
speaking Colombia’s civil war (although UCDP trends over time
generally matched well) [51]. An exceptionally wide gap occurred
between UCDP fatality numbers and locally-sourced Colombian
fatality numbers in a year that was marked by particularly intense
conflict coupled with Colombia’s pivotal presidential election.
The authors speculated that in an overload of internationally
newsworthy stories from Colombia, many smaller conflict events
(and their associated fatalities) were not picked up by interna-
tional news agencies [51].
UCDP spends almost equal time collecting data from news
media and from NGO reports, monographs, and other sources.
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UCDP then triangulates between multiple sources to estimate
actors’ fatality figures (e.g. witness reports to a truth commission
may supplement or be compared to media reported data and
NGO reports on a massacre). Reports are traced back to their
primary source, when possible, in order to determine reliability,
and potential biases of sources are taken into consideration when
determining UCDP Best estimates [5]. UCDP includes local news
reports in its searches to some extent [5], but is limited to reports
published or translated into the English language. Journalistic
coverage of some areas, such as sub-Saharan Africa, may be lower,
making it difficult to establish exact numbers of fatalities [5,49].
Although UCDP fatality numbers can be viewed as being ‘‘too
low’’, i.e. not perfectly representing the actual number of fatalities
from a conflict or from one-sided violence, UCDP does not claim
to provide a perfect mirror-image of reality, but instead stresses
that its Best estimates provide a systematically derived, reliable
baseline, useful for cross-country and temporal comparison [5,49].
Although we have described here the limitations and possible
biases that can affect UCDP estimates of absolute numbers of
fatalities, it is important to emphasize that no published critique
has questioned or tested civilian targeting to battle-death fatality
ratios of the kind we use in our study. Plausible critiques that are
relevant to our study could include that some actors are better at
hiding their hand in massacres than are others (thus lowering their
CTI), or that there are large undercounts for total deaths
specifically for actors with high CTI scores. To date these possible
biases have not been systematically studied. Although these
potential biases should be kept in mind by the reader, especially
when viewing findings for specific actors, we know of no clear
reason to believe that these possible problems are of a magnitude
and consistency that would compromise the global trends we find
in our study.
Stata 11.1 was used for statistical analysis to calculate means,
proportions and regressions. Proportions were compared using
chi-square testing, and means using one-way ANOVA, to obtain
two-tailed P values.
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